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Ensuring representation of ethnic minorities in national level decision making is one of 
the important challenges that ethnically diverse societies face. A number of alternative 
institutional arrangements aimed at securing minority representation has been discussed
1
 in the 
academic literature. This discussion is energized by the practical need to provide policy advice on 
how to craft institutions in ethnically plural states that go through the periods of democratization 
and/or post conflict reconciliation. While the relevance of this discussion is ensured by political 
developments in different parts of the world, the evidential base for judging the effectiveness of 
different institutional arrangements has remained somewhat limited. This is due partly to the 
newness of some institutional arrangements and partly to the lack of systematic inquiry into 
different type of consequences of choosing a specific mechanism of communal representation. 
For example, a recent review of reserved seat provisions, which constitute one type of  targeted 
electoral mechanisms, suggests that reserved seats are  much more common and much more 
understudied
2
 than it has usually been assumed. 
 This paper contributes to the study of representational consequences of electoral 
mechanisms by providing a detailed analysis of ethnic representation in the Romanian case. This 
case is of particular interest to research on ethnic minority representation as Romania‟s electoral 
rules establish a number of distinct institutional channels for gaining legislative representation in 
the lower chamber of national parliament. These rules have also been relatively stable since the 
start of post-communist transition, which provides an important leverage for discussing long term 
effects of specific institutional choices
3
.  
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, Romania‟s electoral system has combined closed-list 
proportional representation with increasingly generous provisions
4
 for minority reserved seats. 
Closed-list proportional representation rules have been designed in a way that permit the 
                                                 
1
 B. Reilly, Democracy in divided societies: electoral engineering for conflict management (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge UK and  New York, 2001) ; P. Norris, Driving Democracy: do power-sharing 
regimes work? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and  New York, 2007) ; L.J. Diamond and 
M.F. Plattner, Electoral systems and democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006). 
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 A. Reynolds, "Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note", 30 Legislative Studies 
Quarterly (2005), 301-310. 
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Change in Eastern Europe (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2004) ; J.K. Birnir, "Institutionalizing the Party 
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Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu and K. Williams (eds.), Embodying democracy: electoral system design in 
post-Communist Europe (Palgrave, New York, 2002) ; S. Roper, "Parliamentary Development", in: 
Romania since 1989: politics, economics and society (Lexington Books, Lanham, Boulder and New York, 
2004). 
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 C.C. Alionescu, "Parliamentary Representation of Minorities in Romania", 5 Southeast European Politics 
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existence and continuing electoral success in PR competition of a party of largest ethnic minority, 
the Hungarians
5
.  The reserved seats provisions, intended to benefit minorities numerically 
smaller than the Hungarians, were first introduced for the 1990 parliamentary elections and since 
then the number of reserved seats has been extended to cover all smaller minorities on the „one 
ethnic group-one reserved seat‟ basis. All these features of the Romanian electoral system could 
be conceptualized as providing three distinct routes for entering the parliament for ethnic 
minorities. Firstly, minority group members could be included in the winning portion of electoral 
lists of mainstream political parties; secondly, they could enter the parliament on the ticket of the 
ethnic Hungarian party, which has been consistently represented in the Romanian parliament; or, 
thirdly, they can become deputies by winning elections to one of the specially reserved 
parliamentary seats for smaller minorities. 
 This paper compares how different institutional mechanisms for legislative representation 
affect the ethnic and social composition of the national legislature. It provides a systematic 
analysis of how groups of deputies defined by the type of electoral mechanism that enabled their 
entrance into parliament vary on key indicators of social inclusiveness. By doing so the paper 
generates a number of insights into both majority and minority parties‟ recruitment preferences 
and practices. With rare exceptions
6
,  these issues remain largely overlooked in an otherwise rich 
literature on minority issues in party politics in the post-communist region
7
. The paper helps to 
start filling this gap by combining analysis of ethnic and social backgrounds of members of 
parliament.  
 Ethnicity is viewed here as one of the dimensions of social representation. The focus of 
the literature on social representation is on how far the parliament reflects the society from which 
it is drawn in terms of key societal divisions such as ethnicity, class, and gender
8
. Diverse 
                                                 
5
 J.K. Birnir, Ethnicity and electoral politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and  New York, 
2007). 
6
 R. Moser, "Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia", 40 
Comparative Politics (2008) ; M. Edinger and M. Kuklys, "Ethnische Minderheiten im Parlament", 57 
Osteuropa (2007), 163-175. 
7
 Z. Barany and R. Moser, Ethnic Politics after Communism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 
2005) ; J.K. Birner, Ethnicity and electoral politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and New 
York, 2007) ; J.T. Ishiyama and M. Breuning, Ethnopolitics in the New Europe (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Boulder, 1998) ; J.P. Stein, The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: 
State-Building, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2000) ; J. Bugajski, Ethnic 
politics in Eastern Europe: a guide to nationality policies, organizations and parties (M.E. Sharpe, 
Armonk, 1995). 
8
 P. Norris and M. Franklin, "Social representation", 32 European Journal of Political Research (1997), 
185-210. 
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representation is often conceptualized as a normative good
9
. However, a large literature also 
exists that points to  important political and policy consequences of diverse social representation. 
The existence of the relationship between the failure of parliaments to reflect society and the 
weak legitimacy of parliamentary bodies is postulated in studies of both international and national 
representative institutions
10
. Social background characteristics are demonstrated  to influence 
policy priorities, role perception and attitudes of legislators in different national contexts
11
.  
The paper proceeds by providing first the general picture of ethnic representativeness of 
the Romanian parliament. In doing so, it addresses the issue of proportionality of ethnic 
representation and briefly discusses how the Romanian data illustrates some of the liberal 
democratic theory concerns about the fairness of minority-defined group provisions. It then turns 
to the discussion of how data on parliamentary representatives‟ ethnic profile sheds light on the 
mainstream parties‟ approaches towards minority recruitment and, more generally, competition 
for minority support.  The final section of the paper examines how inclusive the groups of 
deputies elected through different institutional channels are in terms of gender, occupational 
background, and other social characteristics. The paper concludes by summarizing what the 
Romanian data on ethnic and social representation tells us about the effects of alternative 
electoral mechanisms on social inclusion and what further evidence is needed to corroborate or 
refute hypotheses generated by studying the Romanian experience. 
 
 
 
Data and measurement 
                                                 
9
 A. Reynolds, "Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A Research Note", 30 Legislative Studies 
Quarterly (2005), 301-310. 
10
 P. Norris and M. Franklin, "Social representation", 32 European Journal of Political Research (1997), 
185-210 ; H. Best and M. Cotta, Parliamentary representatives in Europe, 1848-2000: legislative 
recruitment and careers in eleven European countries (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 
2000) ; B. Wessels, "Germany", in: P. Norris (ed.), Passages To Power: Legislative Recruitment in 
Advanced Democracies (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and New York, 1997), 76-97.  
11
 S. Thomas, How women legislate (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994 ; P. Esaisson 
and S. Holmberg, Representation from Above: Members of  Parliament and Representative Democracy in 
Sweden (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1996) ; W.J. Patzelt, "Recruitment and Retention in 
Western European Parliaments", in: G. Loewenberg and D.R. Kiewiet (eds.), Legislatures: Comparative 
Perspectives on Representative Assemblies (University of  Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2002), 80-119 ; 
D.T. Canon, Race, redistricting and representation: the unintended consequences of Black majority 
districts (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London) ; K. Bird, "Patterns of Substantive 
Representation Among Visible Minority MPs: Evidence from Canada‟s House of Commons", Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL, April 03-06, 2008, 
Available at, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p268294_index.html, Access date: 15 July 2008.   
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The social and political background data was collected for all the deputies elected into the 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies during the past five consecutive parliamentary terms throughout 
the 1990-2004 period. The dataset includes observations on both deputies that served a full 
parliamentary term and those that served a part of the term. The dataset thus includes all deputies 
that entered the parliament throughout the 2004-2008 parliamentary term. The dataset has 1,950 
observations, where the unit of observation is a deputy/parliamentary term.   
The coding of data was based primarily on information that was self-reported by the 
deputies and published in the official publications of the Romanian parliament.
12
 This data was 
supplemented by information from a scholarly work
13
 and other published sources produced by a 
number of commercial and nongovernmental organizations
14
. The information on the ethnic 
affiliation of deputies was compiled in cooperation with Romanian specialized institutions on 
minority issues, whose experts were recruited to help ensure the accuracy of ethic affiliation 
data.
15
  While the coding of demographic variables such as age and gender is self-explanatory and 
straightforward, the classification rules for coding occupation, educational type, and other social 
variables could follow different logics. The rationale for coding decisions made with respect to 
the latter variables is discussed in the text when the data on these variables is presented.  
 
 
 Proportionality of ethnic representation   
Minorities have been successful in securing legislative representation in Romania. The 
analysis of data on the ethnic composition of the entire corps of deputies that served in the lower 
chamber of the parliament since the start of the post-communist transition points to a significant 
presence of minorities in the parliament. In fact, the data indicates that the share of seats occupied 
by ethnic minorities is slightly higher than the minorities‟ population share.  The fact of minority 
                                                 
12
 Official parliamentary data was accessed fom Camera deputatilor. Structurile alto legislature, Available 
at, http://www.cdep.ro, Access date: 15 July 2008. 
13
 L. Stefan, Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania (Ziua, Bucharest, 2004). 
14
 Rompres, Protagonisti ai vietii publice. Decembrie 1989-Decembrie 1994 [Protagonists of public life 
December 1989-December 1994], vols. 1-3(Agentia Nationala de presa Rompres, 1994) ; Asociata Pro 
Democratia, Cartea albastra a democratiei. Un ghid al institutiilor public central [Blue book of democracy. 
A guide to central public institutions] (4
th
 ed.) (Also Press, Bucharest, 2006). 
15
 Experts represented the following institutions: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturala-
Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center, Cluj, Romania; Liga Pro Europa – Pro Europe League, Tîrgu-
Mures, Romania. 
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over-representation is significant in itself, given the persistent concerns about minority under 
representation in the literature on minority political participation.   
Table 1 combines data on ethnic distribution of the population with the data on ethnic 
composition of the Romanian parliament. It lists population and parliamentary shares of all 
minority groups represented in the parliament and provides frequency information on a number of 
deputies of  each ethnic background.   The last column gives scores for proportionality of 
representation index, which is calculated by dividing an ethnic group‟s proportion in the 
parliament by its proportion in the population. This provides a single summary figure where 1.0 
symbolizes “perfect” proportional representation, more than 1.0 designates a degree of “over-
representation” and less than 1.0 indicates “under-representation”.  
 
The aggregate results presented in the table indicate that the majority group, ethnic 
Romanians, was slightly under-represented in the national legislature. All minority groups listed 
in the table, with exception of Roma, were overrepresented. The degree of over-representation  
was inversely related to the demographic size of the group: the smaller the population share of the 
group the more overrepresented the group was in the parliament. The main exception from this 
pattern – the situation of the second largest minority in the country, Roma,  - has received 
considerable attention in the literature that deals with particular challenges this minority group 
faces in terms of collective action problems and social stigmatization
16
.  
                                                 
16
 Z. Barany, "Romani Marginality and Politics", in: H.F. Carey (ed.), Romania since 1989: politics, 
economics, and society (Lexington, Lanham), 255-274 ; P. Vermeersch, Romani movement: minority 
politics and ethnic mobilization in contemporary Central Europe (Berghahn Books, New York, 2006). 
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Table 1. Ethnic background of Romanian legislators, 1990-2007 
Ethnicity 
Population 
Share (%) 
Legislative 
Share (%) 
Legislative 
Frequency 
Count (N) 
Proportionality 
of Representation 
Index 
     Romanian  89.47 87.79 1,712 0.98 
Hungarian  6.6 7.23 141 1.1 
Roma  2.46 0.36 7(5) 0.15 
Ukrainian 0.28 0.36 7(6*) 1.29 
German  0.27 0.72 14(6*) 2.67 
Lipovan Russian  0.16 0.26 5(5) 1.63 
Turk  0.14 0.36 7(5) 2.57 
Tatar  0.11 0.26 5(5) 2.36 
Serb  0.1 0.26 5(5) 2.6 
Czech and Slovak  0.09 0.26 5(5) 2.89 
Bulgarian  0.03 0.31 6(6*) 10.33 
Croat  0.03 0.1 2(2) 3.33 
Greek  0.02 0.26 5(5) 13 
Jewish  0.02 0.36 7(3) 18 
Italian  0.01 0.21 4(4) 21 
Polish  0.01 0.31 6(6*) 31 
Armenian 0.008 0.26 5(5) 32.5 
Macedonian  0.003 0.1 2(2) 33.33 
Albanian 0.002 0.15 3(3) 75 
Ruthenian  0.001 0.1 2(2) 100 
     Total  99.81 100 1,950  
Notes: () - numbers in parentheses indicate how many  deputies of a given ethnic background were elected 
through the reserved seats provisions 
* - indicates that two deputies  served consecutively in the same reserved seat during a single parliamentary 
term: 1996-00 – Bulgarian and German minority reserved seats; 2000-04 – Polish; 2004-08 – Ukrainian. 
Sources: Population data from the 2002 national census; Legislative data is based on authors‟ calculations. 
 
 
 
The success in securing legislative representation by the majority of smaller ethnic 
groups listed in Table 1 is due exclusively to the reserved seats provisions. Parenthesis numbers 
in the frequency column of the table indicate how many deputies in each of the smaller ethnic 
groups entered the parliament through the reserved seats mechanism. Thus, five out of seven 
Roma deputies and five out of five Serb deputies that served in the national parliament 
throughout the post-communist period were elected through the reserved seats procedures. The 
information provided in the parliamentary shares and frequency columns of the table somewhat 
inflates the legislative share of some ethnic groups because  it includes in the count both those 
deputies that entered the parliament at the beginning of the term and those who came later in the  
9 
 
term as substitutes for deputies who had resigned or died. These overestimations are indicated in 
the case of reserved seats deputies with an asterisk sign (*) and have only a minor effect on the 
overall picture of ethnic distribution in parliament presented in Table 1. 
Since the start of the post-communist transition, the Romanian electoral law contains 
very liberal provisions for minority groups to gain legislative representation. The 1990 law on 
organization of elections granted one seat in the lower chamber of parliament for each minority 
group that failed to obtain representation through the regular electoral procedure. The latter is 
based on a closed-list proportional representation in forty two constituencies with an electoral 
threshold that was raised from zero for the founding 1990 elections, to 3 % for the 1992 and 1996 
elections, and to 5 % for parties and 8-10 % for electoral coalitions in the subsequent elections. 
Non-governmental organizations of ethnic minorities can also participate in elections and can 
send their representative to parliament provided they receive at least 5% of the average number of 
votes needed for the election of one deputy. Since 2004 the percentage was raised to 10% of the 
average number of votes for the election of one deputy
17
. 
These electoral provisions encouraged minorities to self-organize for purposes of gaining 
representation. Eleven minorities gained a seat in the aftermath of the 1990 elections. The number 
of ethnic minorities that qualified for having a parliamentary seat increased with every successive 
round of parliamentary elections and peaked at 18 for the 2000 and 2004 elections. The 
provisions are generally seen as encouraging a broad representation of minorities and as creating 
a competitive environment for deciding on who should serve as a representative of the minority 
group. The majority of ethnic groups routinely see more than one minority organization 
competing for the right to represent a specific ethnic community
18
.   
 Yet questions about the problematic democratic legitimacy of reserved seats provisions 
have already been raised in the Romanian case. The low vote requirement is perceived as both 
non-democratic and as a source of potential abuse due to the ability of entrepreneurial candidates 
to negotiate votes in support of their candidacy from individuals and groups not related to the 
minority community. Another criticism focuses on the proliferation of identity-based claims that 
are not grounded in the actual existence of identity groups, which the reserved seats encourage.  
Alionescu (2004) cites as an  example of this tendency, the creation for electoral purposes of the 
minority organization of Slav Macedonians – the group was unrecorded  at the 1992 census and 
                                                 
17
 M. Popescu, "Romania: Stability Without Consensus", in: S. Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu, and K. 
Williams (eds.), Embodying democracy: electoral system design in post-Communist Europe (Palgrave, 
New York, 2002) ; C.C. Alionescu, "Parliamentary representation of Minorities in Romania", 5 Southeast 
European Politics (2004), 60-75. 
18
 C.C. Alionescu, "Parliamentary representation of Minorities in Romania", 5 Southeast European Politics 
(2004), 60-75. 
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registered only 751 members in the 2002 census. The questions regarding the legitimacy of 
reserved seats, however, did not amount to any serious attempt to eliminate the reserved seats 
provisions or severely restrict their availability. Given that the costs of maintaining reserved seats 
provisions entail only a small degree of ethnic majority‟s underrepresentation in parliament, the 
likelihood of long term viability of these provisions is rather high.
19
   
The second row in Table 1 provides information on ethnic Hungarians, which is the 
largest minority group in the country. The absence of parenthesis next to the number of ethnic 
Hungarians in the frequency count column indicates that reserved seats provisions were not 
applied to this group.  Political mobilization of ethnic Hungarians at the start of the post-
communist transition resulted in  the establishment of a political party that proved to be 
successful in gaining representation through the regular rules of PR competition
20
. The 
overwhelming majority of deputies listed in Table 1 as having ethnic Hungarian background 
entered the parliament through the lists of the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania 
(UDMR). The party, whose parliamentary vote share varied between 7.2%   and 6.2% throughout 
the entire post-communist period, has been represented in all consecutive parliamentary terms.  
 
Minority inclusion in political parties 
 The presence of minorities in the winning portions of the electoral lists of main political 
parties can serve as one indicator of parties‟ willingness to recruit ethnic minority representatives 
and to promote them through the party ranks. Candidate recruitment and selection are complex 
issues that receive a considerable amount of attention in the literature
21
. In the case of the close-
list PR electoral system, which has been in place in Romania since 1990, party leadership 
exercises considerable power over who is put on the list by controlling appointment procedures
22
. 
Although several Romanian parties tried to experiment with the election of candidates, the party 
leadership is widely perceived to be in control of list composition. In most of the cases party 
                                                 
19
 Political support for maintaining these provisions is also based on the perception that reserved seats 
signal a continuing commitment to ethnic minority inclusion, a normatively important issue in the 
European context. See G.J. Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe. The Power of Norms and Inventives 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004). 
20
 M. Shafir, "The Political Party as National Holding Company: The Hungarian Democratic Federation of 
Romania",  in: J.P. Stein (ed.), the Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe: 
State-Building, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2000), 101-129. 
21
 R. Y. Hazat and G. Rahat, "Candidate Selection: Methods and Conseqences", in: R. Katz and W. Crotty 
(eds.), Handbook of Party Politics (Sage, London, 2005), 109-122 ; P. Norris, "Recruitment", in: R. Katz 
and W. Crotty (eds.) Handbook of Party Politics (Sage, London, 2005), 89-108. 
22
 L. Stefan, Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania (Ziua, Bucharest, 2004). 
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leadership has reasonably accurate expectations about how many candidates from their lists are 
likely to enter parliament in any given elections. The composition of party factions in parliament 
therefore reflects party leadership priorities in terms of candidate selection. 
 To evaluate party efforts to include minorities in their lists, we provide details on the 
ethnic composition of groups of deputies which are defined by the type of institutional channel 
through which a deputy entered the parliament. Table 2 below distinguishes between three such 
channels: PR seats, reserved seats, minority party seats. Minority party category refers here to the 
UDMR, the party of ethnic Hungarians. Although the UDMR has to follow the general rules of 
PR competition to gain representation in parliament
23
, it has a special status among parliamentary 
parties due to its full and, among parliamentary parties, exclusive identification with the ethnic 
Hungarian minority group. The PR seats category includes deputies elected on the lists of all 
other parties. The label “PR seats” for this category is not entirely satisfactory but neither are its 
alternatives such as “non-ethnic,” “civic,” or “class-based” parties. As such, we adopted the more 
neutral term “PR seats” for the purposes of this presentation. Each of deputies in our dataset falls 
in one of the three categories described above. 
 
 
Table 2. Ethnic background of Romanian legislators, by type  of legislative seat, 1990-2007 
  
Type of seat 
 
  
PR Seats 
 
Reserved Seats Minority Party Total 
Ethnicity 
Romanian 98.90% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
87.79% 
  
(1712) 
 
(0) 
 
(0)  (1712) 
Hungarian 0.12% 
 
0% 
 
100%  7.23% 
  
(2) 
 
(0) 
 
(139) 
 
(141) 
Other 
 
0.98% 
 
100% 
 
0% 
 
4.97% 
  
(17) 
 
(80) 
 
(0) 
 
(97) 
         
 
Total 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
(N) 
 
(1731) 
 
(80) 
 
(139) 
 
(1950) 
Source: authors‟ calculations.  
 
                                                 
23
 J.K. Birnir, Ethnicity and electoral politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK and New York, 
2007);  M. Shafir, "The Political Party as a National Holding Company: The Hungarian Democratic 
Federation of Romania", in: J.P. Stein (ed.), The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-
Communist Europe: State-Building, Democracy and Ethnic Mobilization (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2000) ; 
E.K. Jenne, Ethnic bargaining: the paradox of minority empowerment (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and 
London, 2007). 
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The data in Table 2 suggests that the existence of electoral mechanisms ensuring the 
legislative representation of ethnic Hungarians and smaller minorities creates disincentives for 
main parties to recruit minorities to positions of authority in their organizations. As the first 
column of the table indicates, only 19 out of 1731 deputies that entered parliament through the 
“PR seats” category were identified as belonging to ethnic minorities. Such a low share of 
minorities on party lists - (1.1%) - can not be attributed to chance. The probability of such a result 
if this group of deputies constituted a sample randomly drawn from population with 10.53 % 
minority share (which is the case in Romania according to the 2002 census), is extremely low. 
Political parties thus seem to have chosen a strategy of not targeting minority groups in terms of 
recruitment efforts. 
This choice is likely to be rooted in parties‟ electoral calculations. Parliamentary seats are 
scarce and highly valuable prizes awarded by the party leadership to those with high potential to 
contribute to the advancement of party electoral goals. Given that the minority party and the 
reserved seats candidates are already in competition for minority votes, the inclusion of minority 
candidates on the party lists does not guarantee main parties the electoral support of minorities. In 
the Romanian party leaderships‟ calculations this uncertainty about payoffs in terms of minority 
votes is combined with the knowledge about rather limited demographic weight of most minority 
groups. Allocating highly valuable positions on party lists to representatives of minority groups 
thus becomes a costly strategy with uncertain benefits to a party, if party goals are conceptualized 
in terms of maximizing electoral support. 
A somewhat similar logic of avoiding costly investments with uncertain returns can 
explain the absence of deputies with ethnic background other than Hungarian, from the group of 
deputies elected on the list of the minority party. As the third column in Table 2 indicates, none of 
the 139 UDMR deputies belonged to other than the Hungarian ethnic group.  This suggests that 
the party chose not to compete for support of other minority groups and also abstained from using 
the recruitment to the high profile party positions as means of developing some appeal to the 
voters from the ethnic majority group. Overall, the data on the ethnic composition of the 
UDMR‟s faction over almost two decades of the party‟s presence in the legislature indicates no 
attempts on the part of the party to break out of its status of existing as a strictly a mono-ethnic 
organization.  
Nineteen minority deputies from the PR seats column of Table 2 were approximately 
equally distributed among five parliamentary terms, which suggests there was no temporary 
variation in terms of electorally successful parties‟ interest in minority recruitment. Neither has 
13 
 
there been significant variation in terms of minority recruitment between parties of different 
ideological orientation. While the comparative literature‟s expectation is that left parties would be 
more minority friendly, the Romanian data does not fit this expectation, which can be partly 
attributed to the nationalist affinities of post-communist left in Romania
24
.  Six out of nineteen 
minority deputies, which is the largest subset of minority deputies belonging to the same party, 
come from the main communist successor party, the Romanian Social Democratic Party
25
. Yet 
given that the deputies from this party constitute numerically the largest group in parliament (523 
out of 1950 deputies in our dataset) the share of minority deputies in this party amounts to 
slightly more than 1% . This figure is almost identical to the general share of minorities from the 
PR seats column in Table 2. 
The very small number of ethnic minority deputies in the parliamentary factions of main 
political parties indicates that these parties do not attempt to compete for minority votes, 
including the votes of the largest minority, ethnic Hungarians. Additional evidence for the lack of 
these parties‟ interest in minority issues is provided by the role that minority deputies play or, 
more precisely, abstain from playing in these parties. Parties rarely use the opportunity to have 
minority deputies to serve as spokespersons on minority-related policy debates. The deputies lack 
the profile as representatives of ethnic communities. This is confirmed by the frequent failure of 
minority organizations that participate in reserved seats‟ electoral campaigns to acknowledge the 
party lists‟ minority deputies as the legitimate representatives of their ethnic communities. While 
some of this failure could be attributed to rivalry and the desire to monopolize ethnic group 
representation by minority organizations competing in the reserved seats‟ segments of 
parliamentary campaigns, the weakness of the profile of the party lists‟ minority MPs on ethnic 
community issues makes this denial strategy more credible. These conclusions are drawn from 
the results of a survey of Romanian ethnic minority organizations and political parties conducted 
in the period June-August 2007. The questionnaire mailed to ethnic minority organizations 
requested them to identify in each parliamentary term the MPs who are members of their 
respective ethnic groups. The majority of responses only identified as members of their ethnic 
group deputies who had served in the reserved seats‟ positions. The questionnaire for the political 
parties requested party secretariats to list all ethnic minority MPs that served in the parliament on 
behalf of their party. The very high rate of non-response to this questionnaire ever after the 
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follow-up reminders had been issued precludes a discussion of the results but serves as one 
indirect indicator of the political parties‟ level of interest in minority issues.  
 To summarize, the data on parliamentary representation suggests that the Romanian 
parties are mono-ethnic organizations. The outcome of minority non-inclusion in party ranks 
should be viewed not as some inevitable product of the underlying demographic configuration or 
some other structural factors, but as a result of parties‟ conscious decisions not to invest in the 
construction of multi-ethnic organizations in the light of incentives produced by a particular 
combination of the electoral mechanisms adopted in Romania. A strategy of building more 
ethnically inclusive political organizations and going after multiethnic appeal was available to the 
Romanian parties at the start of the post-communist transition, but the initial choices made with 
respect to the design of electoral institutions reduced parties‟ incentives to follow such a strategy. 
 
   
Social profile of minority deputies 
The main question this section addresses is whether there is a relationship between the 
type of institutional channel through which the minority deputy entered the parliament and social 
diversity of minority representation. As such, it follows the same strategy as the previous section 
in comparing three groups of deputies: PR seats, reserved seats, and minority party seats. The 
social inclusiveness of these deputy groups is compared in terms of gender and age, occupation, 
and education. The data on the social profile of deputies in the PR lists combines information on 
majority and minority deputies. The reason for this is that the number of minority deputies elected 
on the PR lists is very small, which restricts the reliability of any conclusions based on data from 
this particular subgroup. 
As has been long established in the literature, parliaments are highly skewed in terms of 
social representation. They draw disproportionally from better-educated, more affluent, middle-
aged, and male sections of society
26
 . The Romanian parliament fits this profile well
27
. Some of 
the key social disproportions in this particular case are on a much larger scale than has usually 
been found in the rest of Europe. Even against this backdrop of a generally poor record, the 
minority party, the UDMR, stands out in terms of the lack of social inclusiveness.  As the 
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following discussion will demonstrate, it consistently underperforms other groups in parliament 
in terms of the various characteristics of social inclusiveness. 
This finding provides an important insight into the dynamics of minority representation 
and highlights some problematic tendencies of social exclusion in ethnically defined parties. 
While recent scholarship on ethnic politics emphasizes the constructive role that minority parties 
play in terms of increasing the stability of democratic transition
28
  or sustaining a democratic 
system
29
, this paper points to the social costs of an ethnic party‟s monopoly on legislative 
representation.  The realization of the circumstances under which these costs are likely to arise is 
highly significant for any discussion of minority party performance. 
 
Gender and age.  The Romanian parliament is firmly positioned on the lower end of the 
distribution of the European parliaments in terms of gender parity.
30
 The percentage of women in 
parliament is very low. This is despite the presence of some institutional and structural factors 
consistently associated with the higher levels of female representation such as PR electoral 
system (with the medium district magnitude), welfare state socialism, leftist parties in 
parliament
31
. Yet these underlying factors have not been translated in the Romanian case into 
gender-related affirmative action policies that are often the most immediate cause of high female 
representation in parliament. Romania‟s electoral laws do not have any gender related provisions 
and political parties have not committed themselves through internal regulations to the use of 
gender quotas in their parliamentary lists.  
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Table 3. Gender of Romanian legislators, by type  of legislative 
seat, 1990-2007 
Type of seat 
 
 
PR Seats 
Reserved 
Seats 
Minority 
Party Total 
 
      Male  91.74% 90% 97.84% 92.1% 
  
Female 8.26% 10% 2.16% 7.9% 
 
      Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 (N) (1731) (80) (139) (1950) 
Note:  Cross-tabulation statistics  for PR lists and  minority party seats: 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   6.6578   Pr = 0.010; Cramér's V =  -0.0597. 
          For reserved seats and minority party seats: 
          Pearson chi2(1) =   6.5451   Pr = 0.011; Cramér's V =  -0.1729. 
 
 
  
 As Table 3 indicates, the minority party scores the worst in terms of gender inclusion. 
Only 7.9 % of deputies that served in the Romanian parliament since the start of transition were 
women. The share of women in the group of minority party deputies was 2.16%. This is 
compared to the 10 % share of women in the reserved seats and 8.26% share in the rest of 
parliamentary parties. As the chi-square test results provided at the bottom of the table indicate, 
gender share differences are statistically significant both when minority party deputies are 
compared with the deputies from the rest of parliamentary parties and when minority party 
deputies are compared with reserved seats deputies. Cramer‟s V measure of association reflects a 
modest relationship between type of legislative seat and gender inclusiveness in the first 
comparison and a stronger relationship in the second comparison. 
 Minority party‟s gender exclusiveness can be hypothesized to be a product of the ethnic 
type of voter linkage that the party cultivates. A substantial amount of recent research
32
 points to 
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the relative stability of electoral support enjoyed by minority parties and to their ability to survive 
performance failures without losing the support of their ethnically defined electorate. The ethnic 
nature of a minority party‟s appeal to the voters might allow the party not only to survive bad 
policy performance but also to ignore social inclusion requirements to a substantially larger 
extent than other parties in political system can afford to.  If the thesis about minority parties, 
being forgiven by their electorate for policy failures on issues such as economy or social welfare 
is correct, than minority parties can also be expected to have an easier ride in terms of voters‟ 
dissatisfaction with the party being socially non-inclusive.  
The ethnic party‟s relatively high level of confidence in loyalty of voters can thus be seen 
as an important factor in party decisions with regard to candidate selection. This confidence 
weakens the incentives for the party to be more gender inclusive. Given the demographic size of 
the ethnic Hungarian community, the electoral rules and the structure of party competition permit 
the existence of only one electorally successful ethnic Hungarian party. An ethnic Hungarian 
voter, who prefers to vote for  ethnic party but dislikes the UDMR‟s economic  policies or 
recruitment decisions, faces the vote wasting dilemma in supporting smaller Hungarian parties. 
This points to the problems with the structure of supply of political alternatives for the voters, 
rather than to the lack of societal demand for more inclusive representation. The recent increase 
in public opinion polls of the popularity of another ethnic Hungarian party, the Hungarian Civic 
Party (HCP), can serve as one indicator of ethnic Hungarian voters‟ growing dissatisfaction with 
the incumbent minority party
33
.   
The share of female deputies was the highest amongst reserved seats MPs.  The relative 
success of women in these races might be attributed to their competitive advantages in projecting 
competence and authority on the types of issues that are salient in the reserved seats‟ segment of 
electoral competition. The reserved seats competition tends to revolve around the cultural needs 
of territorially dispersed communities and the minority organizations‟ ability to ensure the 
minority group‟s symbolic visibility on the national scene.  Typical educational and occupational 
backgrounds that women acquire through their careers should make them more competitive in 
winning the races defined by this type of issues rather than by competence in bringing some 
tangible and, usually, economically defined benefits to territorially concentrated communities. 
The prospect of being successful in campaigning on behalf of minority organizations whose 
names appear on the electoral ballot therefore allows women to win the minority organizations‟ 
nomination in the first place. 
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 The pattern of gender differences among the deputy groups, which highlights the gender 
exclusiveness of minority party representation, is not replicated in the distribution of another 
important demographic variable, age. A summary measure of age distribution points to moderate 
differences among deputy groups: median age varies between 47 years for the minority party, 48 
for the PR seats, and 49 for the reserved seats. When age differences are classified into three 
categories  - younger deputies (18-35 years), middle (36-55 years), and older (56 plus) – between 
58-65% of deputies in each type of parliamentary seat belong to the middle age group.  The 
minority party, however, has a much higher share of deputies from the younger cohort: about 
19% as compared to 10% for the PR seats and 9% for the reserved seats. A close examination of 
data reveals that the fact of a high share of younger MPs in the minority party can not be 
attributed to the effects of many young deputies entering into parliament at the start of transition 
(when the UDMR was just formed) and then retaining the seat due to a higher incumbency rate 
for minority party deputies. UDMR continued to select candidates from the younger cohort to 
represent the party in the parliament throughout all subsequent parliamentary terms included in 
this study. The observed differences in the minority party‟s willingness to include women and 
younger people into the winning portion of the electoral list might be attributed to the different 
weight that party‟s youth and women‟s organizations in the party‟s internal politics.   
 
Occupation. Different approaches to analysing occupational background can be 
employed to discuss social inclusiveness
34
. The task of defining an occupational status is 
increasingly challenging in itself. The class distinction used in some of the earlier literature on 
social representation does not adequately capture the variation in terms of professional 
background and segmentation of occupational roles that post-industrial societies have developed. 
Among other things, the professionalization of political careers in modern democracies 
contributed to the further  decline in the proportion  of working-class MPs across the European 
continent
35
. 
We chose to categorize occupational background in a way that provides some leverage in 
differentiating deputies‟ backgrounds in terms of occupational specialization and occupational 
prestige. All the occupational backgrounds of MPs were classified into six basic categories: 
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professionals, culture and education, business entrepreneurs, civil service, politicians, other. Since 
only 22 deputies or 1.08% had working class occupational background we did not use a separate 
category for the working-class MPs but put them under the category of “other”.  The coding for 
occupational background is based on the last job position that a deputy held prior to being elected 
to the parliament. In our view, this is more informative than simply coding deputies‟ professional 
training according to whether a person was trained, for example, as an engineer or a doctor. Our 
assumption here is that the most recent professional experience has the most immediate relevance 
for political career advancement.  Using the last job criteria also simplifies coding decisions in 
situations when a deputy has several professions or occupational backgrounds. The latter 
phenomenon is particularly widespread in transitional societies where job and social status 
instability  is pronounced.  
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Graph 1. Occupational Background of Romanian Legislators (1990-2007)
 
 
 
 Graph 1 provides details on the deputies‟ distribution of occupational backgrounds 
according to the type of parliamentary seat. For all three types of deputies, the mode, which is a 
category with the largest number of observations, is politicians. This category includes incumbent 
MPs as well as all other deputies with previous political job experience such as a mayor, a head 
20 
 
of regional assembly, or a full time party functionary. The exact share of politicians in the mode 
category of each distribution varied. The minority party had the highest share of deputies in this 
category, which reflects the higher incumbency rates for this party.  For the minority party, the 
incumbency rate in our dataset is 44%, for reserved seats 33%, and for the PR seats group it is 
24%.  Bringing new people or keeping the incumbent MPs on the party‟s electoral lists for the 
next election is one aspect of the choice that parties face. The data indicates that the minority 
party relied to a very significant extent on professional politicians in forming its parliamentary 
deputy group. In the case of the minority party, the political background category consisted of 
90% of incumbent deputies and 10% of professional politicians without prior parliamentary 
experience. 
The graph also provides the values of the index of diversity for each of the distributions.
36
 
The index captures how equally distributed the observations are amongst different categories of 
the nominal variable, occupational background in this case. The index can be interpreted as the 
probability that two deputies selected at random will be in different categories of occupational 
background variables. The more equally the deputies are distributed among the different 
occupational categories the higher is the probability of the two randomly selected deputies to be 
from the different occupational background. The value of this index indicates that the minority 
party‟s distribution is most concentrated, or least equally spread in terms of deputies‟ 
occupational background. 
An interesting feature of occupational distribution for the reserved seats deputies in 
Graph 1 is the relatively high weight of deputies with education and cultural background. While 
professionals were the second most frequent occupational background of deputies in the two 
other type of seats, education and cultural background features as the second most frequent 
category for the deputies from the reserved seats.  Similar to the case of gender representation, the 
nature of electoral completion in the reserved seats, which attaches high salience to the cultural 
needs of minority communities, seems to be conducive for the electoral success of candidates 
with an occupational background in culture or education.  
 
 
 Education. There are also substantial differences among deputy groups on such important 
social characteristics as education level. Similar to other European societies, university-trained 
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politicians have „taken over‟ parliamentary representation in Romania. Only about 3 % of the 
entire corps of the Romanian deputies elected since 1990 do not have a university degree, which 
is an extremely low share by comparative standards. More than 95% of deputies in the Romanian 
parliament are university graduates.  This is a very high percentage in comparison to most 
European parliaments where a share of deputies with university education, according to a recent 
study, varied during the most recent time period between 65 and 85%
37
. 
Table 4 compares the levels of education attainments among the deputy groups. The 
concentration of deputies in one category of frequency distribution is again found to be the 
highest in the case of the minority party.  
 
Table 4. Educational level of Romanian legislators, 1990-2007 
 
Type of Seat 
 
 
PR Seats 
Reserved 
Seats 
Minority 
Party 
Total 
     Secondary 2.67% 6.41% 0.78% 2.69% 
 
Higher Education  72.86% 65.38% 86.72% 73.51% 
 
Ph.D 24.47% 28.21% 12.5% 23.8% 
     Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(N) (1651) (78) (128) (1857) 
Note:  Table repots education level distribution for non-missing data. The 
percentage of missing data for deputy groups varied between 2.5% and 7.9% . 
Source: Authors‟ calculations. 
 
 
 The table distinguishes between three educational levels.  In each of deputy groups the 
vast majority of deputies had higher than secondary education at the time of entering the 
parliament. The main difference among deputy groups is in the share of deputies with doctoral 
degrees. The share of deputies with a PhD degree is the highest for the reserved seat deputies and 
the lowest for the minority party. This points to a pattern similar to the one found above in the 
analysis of several other social differences among the deputy groups.  
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The low share of PhDs in the minority party in comparison to both the reserved seats 
deputies and deputies from other parties in parliament can serve as an indication of tendency for 
the minority party leadership to favor political experience over educational credentials when 
making decisions about selecting parliamentary representatives. This finding is consistent with 
the earlier reported data on higher levels of professionalization of minority party representation as 
measured by the incumbency rate. The low numbers of PhDs in the party should not, however, be 
interpreted as non-significance of education for making a career in minority party. Having a 
higher education, as the literature suggests, is increasingly perceived as a type of informal 
requirement needed to qualify to serve as party representative in the parliament. The virtual 
absence of representatives  with non-university education in the roster of the UDMR‟s deputies 
suggests that the party‟s behavior conforms to this requirement.   
 More than a quarter of reserved seats deputies had a PhD degree, which puts this group 
on the same level with deputies from parliaments  with the highest reported shares of PhDs
38
.  
The proposition that the reserved seats competition favors candidates whose social background 
helps to project competency on issues related to the cultural needs of communities is also 
supported by the data on the type of education the deputies receive.  About 35% of reserved seats 
deputies had a humanities/social science education as compared to 18% for PR list deputies and 
25% for minority party deputies. Although for all three deputy groups, the mode category of 
education type distribution was sciences, the high share of deputies with humanities/social 
science educational background points to important social differences in the composition of the 
reserved seats deputy group. The sciences educational background, of which the largest 
component was engineering education, was assigned to 54% of the PR list deputies, 40% of the 
reserved seats deputies, and 33% of the minority party deputies. These percentages result from a 
classification that uses five categories for type of education: law, economics/business, 
humanities/social sciences, sciences, secondary/trade education.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper offered a systematic analysis of how groups of deputies defined by the type of 
electoral mechanism that enabled their entrance into parliament vary on key indicators of social 
inclusiveness. It examined how deputy groups vary in terms of ethnic composition, gender and 
age characteristics, occupational and educational background. The results suggest that a number 
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of trade-offs are involved in creating electoral arrangements that attempt to address demands for 
political inclusion of minorities. 
Special provisions for minority reserved seats which were introduced at the start of 
Romania‟s post-communist transition enabled small minority groups to gain representation on a 
scale that, in case of absence of such provisions, would have been highly improbable. If satisfying 
minority groups‟ cultural needs for public presence and representation was the drafters‟ main 
purpose in introducing reserved seats, then the social make-up of representatives, who 
subsequently entered the parliament through this electoral mechanism, suggests that the 
provisions served their purpose. Given the growing popularity of reserved seats arrangements 
cross-nationally, more research is required to develop a better understanding of both electoral 
competition and legislative behaviour of reserved seats representatives. The latter is especially 
needed for evaluating the effectiveness of these provisions in advancing substantive policy 
interests of minority communities. 
At the same time, the paper‟s findings suggest that the very nature of reserved seats 
provisions might be a contributing factor to the lack of ethnic minorities‟ presence in main 
political parties. When the parties‟ rosters of parliamentary deputies are examined, the parties 
emerge as mono-ethnic organizations. Although the paper provides some preliminary evidence 
that the mono-ethnic character of parties‟ parliamentary composition contributed to the lack of 
parties‟ interest in substantive issues related to minorities, further research on parties‟ legislative 
behavior is needed to substantiate this claim. Such research will help to develop a better 
understanding of the consequences of minority communities‟ representation through the reserved 
seats rather than through main political parties. 
Another trade-off suggested by the paper‟s findings involves provisions regulating 
political representation of demographically large minority groups. Electoral provisions might 
encourage ethnic representation at the expense of other characteristics of social representation. 
The paper‟s findings indicate that the minority party was much less inclusive in social terms than 
the group of reserved seats deputies or the rest of the parliament. It is argued here that electoral 
rules contributed to the minority party‟s lack of interest in being socially inclusive.  Whether the 
variation in electoral rules or in the format of minority party competition is associated with 
different levels of social inclusiveness of minority  parties is an important question for further 
research on minority political participation.  
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